

the question that Jütte attempts to answer in *The Age of Secrecy: Jews, Christians, and the Economy of Secrets, 1400–1800*, and his answer opens a surprising new window onto early modern culture. Colorni was hardly the only Jewish professor of secrets—nonetheless, like Colorni most are almost completely unknown to historians. Though framed around a biography of Colorni that takes up nearly half the book, Jütte’s finely crafted study profusely documents the involvement of Jews in the trade in “secrets,” which included secret knowledge as well as exotic objects such as unicorns’ horns. To Christians there was something fundamentally secretive about Jews. Catholics and Reformers alike accused Jews of concealing their “perfidious” doctrines and behavior underneath a veil of secrecy. The idea that Jews were harboring secrets persisted throughout the early modern period. Jütte, while dismissing the discourse about a distinctive Jewish mastery of the arcane, nevertheless makes a strong case that the trade in secrets was “central to premodern Jewish economic life” (5).

Conventional historiography has it that printing provided professors of secrets with opportunities for social and economic advancement. And for most professors of secrets that we know about, that was undoubtedly the case. But while that may have been true for Christians, Jütte argues that for Jews the economy of secrets did not prove to be inferior to the system of open knowledge that characterized the Enlightenment. Indeed, Jütte argues, “the premodern economy of secrets was just as attractive, especially to society’s outsiders, as a system that propagated open knowledge” (249).

This argument has important implications for our understanding of modernity, suggesting that the conventional equation of openness with progress and of secrecy with regression needs to be rethought. That assumption turns out to be only relatively true, Jütte argues, because the economy of secrets generated spaces for two-way interaction between minority and majority communities, while also providing Jews with distinct kinds of social capital. Since it was embedded in the system of patronage, the economy of secrets provided Jews with room to maneuver within an otherwise closed system. Colorni was particularly clever at accomplishing this. Deliberately appropriating the figure of the biblical King Solomon as a model, Colorni fashioned himself as a Jewish magus similar to his more famous Christian contemporary, the Neapolitan magus Giambattista Della Porta.

*The Age of Secrecy* challenges a number of historiographical conventions. For starters, Jütte persuasively argues for the need to identify and assess non-public “spaces of sociability” that served as loci of scientific activity as effectively as the public sphere. Jütte also disputes the “contributory narrative” in Jewish history, namely the question of whether, and to what extent, Jews contributed to the Scientific Revolution. To Jütte, the question is a *question mal posée* because modern historiography has revealed surprising connections between science and the economy of secrecy that Jews were so adept at navigating.

This absorbing and pioneering book, originally published in German in 2012, is an important addition to the

history of early modern Jewish science and culture and to the growing body of scholarship on secrecy and books of secrets in early modern Europe. Jütte moves the subject beyond books, bringing to light a “culture of secrecy” that he argues took shape in early modern Europe. A work grounded in impressive research in archival and early printed sources, *The Age of Secrecy* will be of great interest to historians of science and early modern culture.

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KAREN HAGEMANN. *Revisiting Prussia’s Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture and Memory*. Translations by PAMELA SELWYN. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xiv, 483. \$34.99.

Karen Hagemann’s impressive and well-written new book opens with two full-color prints, examples of “patriotic art” from an 1816 exhibition at the Berlin Academy of Arts; they set the stage for what follows. The first is Georg Friedrich Kersting’s rendering of three members of the German volunteer militia (*Freikorps*) on “outpost duty.” The second, by the same artist, portrays “The Wreath Maker.” Hagemann argues that Kersting’s “diptych . . . represent[ed] a gendered vision of the German nation that was popular in the patriotic circles of the small elite of educated middle- and upper-class men and women in Prussia and beyond at the time of the wars against Napoleon” (4). That the author chose the latter image for the book’s cover emphasizes her commitment to recounting a gendered history of what scholars typically call the Wars of Liberation; Hagemann usually prefers the term “anti-Napoleonic” wars. But the events of 1813 are only her point of departure. Her canvas is much broader and stretches right up to the eve of the First World War, when a single “national myth” of the liberation had coalesced and come to form the “master narrative of German history” (29). In her extended, subtle, and persuasive analysis of the “contested discourses and symbolic practices by which individuals and groups made political claims in the broadest sense” (7), the author reorchestrates nineteenth-century German history in a different key.

Hagemann’s work is especially timely, not least because it examines a period in German history that has fallen on somewhat hard times. Despite the efforts of major scholars such as Christopher Clark (in his *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* [2009]) to deal with the nineteenth century seriously, the majority of historical work on Germany today is weighted toward the late twentieth and even early twenty-first centuries. One regrets this “shrinkage” of German history to a mere several decades, first, because it creates an overabundance of young scholars competing for the same few jobs, and second, because it is shockingly ahistorical. Hagemann’s *Revisiting Prussia’s Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture and Memory* challenges historians to reexamine their ideas about “which history” matters. All German historians are, of course, aware of the anti-Napoleonic wars. Some even have acknowledged their criticality, as in Thomas Nipperdey’s remark that “in the beginning was Napoleon”

(*Deutsche Geschichte: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* [1983]), but recent historiography has neglected their relevance and underplayed the abiding influence they exerted. Hagemann goes far toward correcting this. Indeed, in arguing that the anti-Napoleonic wars created the first European experience of mass warfare (in terms of numbers of troops involved but also in how civilian populations had to “pay the costs of” occupation and annexation [12]), she anchors the early nineteenth century firmly in the broader flow of German and European history, making it a central moment in the development of modern states and political systems. Just as significantly, these conflicts provided the raw material for constructing the master narratives and the collective memories of Germany as it took shape.

As significant as re-centering the early nineteenth century in German history and historiography is, Hagemann’s masterful analysis of the formation of two central and contrasting narratives that ascribed meanings to the Wars of Liberation also raises other questions: Were they “simply a struggle for liberation from French rule led by the Prussian king” (15), or were they a movement from below for national liberation *and* political liberty? Her answer is that they were both. The varied ways in which these narratives unfolded and were perpetuated or suppressed (or partly suppressed), constituted the German nation—or at least the perceptions of that nation—in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While her discussion centers on Prussia (according to her slightly awkward title), she by no means ignores the other Germanies. Rather, she compares the Prussian narrative(s) with alternative regional experiences and recollections. The Rhinish and Saxon situations diverged from the Prussian one because of their erstwhile alliances with France and Napoleon; they were therefore plotted differently.

Hagemann thus has created nothing less than a full-blown analysis of the rise of the German nation—and the idea of that nation—over the course of a century. Her vision is inherently political, but political in a manner that contrasts with what we traditionally consider political history. Accordingly, her sources differ as well. The introduction sketches out an interpretive framework that links history, historiography, and memory, and discusses her decision to base her analysis on “textual representations and cultural practices” (7). Over the course of some four hundred pages, Hagemann analyzes a wide variety of literary media—novels, poetry, journals, and newspapers—and addresses cultural practices that are not limited to large-scale government-sponsored festivals and rites of commemoration. In exploring memories and their construction, she respects the distinction between “communicative” and “cultural memories.” The first is “based on collective communication” (23) of brief duration, lasting no more than a couple of generations. The latter (of greater interest to the author) persisted longer and were “sustained by social and cultural institutions in the form of buildings, monuments, symbols, rituals, arts and texts” (23). In an extended and mostly textual analysis, Hagemann shows how the Wars of Liberation produced competing narratives possessing both political (conservative-monarchical versus liberal-democratic) and gendered va-

lences. From about the 1880s onward, however, the narratives of political liberty and female citizenship disappeared and were replaced by the more familiar Borussian vision. Responsible for this metamorphosis were a “transformation of political culture and the growing influence of academic historiography, which in Imperial Germany was dominated by Prussianism” (404). Yet the eventual enshrinement of this narrative as “the” German historical metanarrative was by no means inevitable. National memories changed; the ones current in the decades immediately after 1813 and that held on for several more decades differed from that which dominated the pre–World War I era. Hagemann’s great contribution here is to have identified these counter and competing narratives. Her textual mining digs up rich veins of material in famous publications such as *Der deutsche Rundschau* and the *Rheinischer Merkur* as well as far less well known and ephemeral ones like *Deutschlands Triumph oder das entjochte Europa*, in works of popular and academic history, and in novels, great and not so great.

*Revisiting Prussia’s Wars against Napoleon* presents a new analysis of nineteenth-century history, advances a manifesto and program for memory studies, and subtly critiques current historiographical trends. Hagemann has crafted a nuanced, judicious, and convincing picture of Prussian history that makes a substantial contribution to what one might call the “new Prussian history” as represented by those who have criticized the *Sonderweg* thesis, by Clark in his *Iron Kingdom*, and by William Hagen in his equally brilliant *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500–1840* (2007).

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STEPHEN G. GROSS. *Export Empire: German Soft Power in Southeastern Europe, 1890–1945*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xiv, 384. \$99.99.

Some months ago, German newspapers reported with a degree of pride that Germany would once again be *Exportweltmeister* (export world champion) in 2016 as measured by the current account surplus and effected primarily through massive merchandise exports. As today, merchandise exports played a pivotal role in the German business model between the early Wilhelminian period and the end of World War II. This period, especially the turbulent decades after World War I, is the focus of Stephen G. Gross’s excellent study *Export Empire: German Soft Power in Southeastern Europe, 1890–1945*. Gross explores the trade relations between Germany and two comparatively small, agrarian, and less industrialized southeastern European countries, Romania and Yugoslavia, and skillfully connects them to international politics and the practices of German imperialism. Analyzing the emergence of German “soft power” and trade-driven imperialism in southeastern Europe, the author pays special attention to the previously neglected role of non-state organizations. Drawing on recent scholarship on trade, international relations, and imperialism, which has underlined non-state